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("Code"), was enacted in 1948,
along with the split-income provi
sions of the income tax law and the

he estate tax marital deduc
tion, section 2056 of the
Internal Revenue Code
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marital deduction and split-gift pro
visions of the gift tax law. The pur
pose was to give married residents of
common law states approximately
the same federal tax advantages that
were available to married residents
of community property states.
Ordinarily, upon the death of a
married resident of a community
property state, only one-half of the
community property is taxed in the
decedent's estate. Section 2056 achieves
approximately the same result for
married residents of common law
states by providing a deduction
limited, in general, to the greater of
$250, 000 or one-half of the estate
for the value of property interests in
cluded in the decedent's gross estate
that pass from the decedent to the
surviving spouse.
The surviving spouse's interest in
community property is a fee interest
that, if retained until death, will be
subject to estate tax. ln order to mir
ror this aspect of community proper! ty, section 2056 does not permit a
marital deduction for life estates or
. ' certain other so-called terminable in
' 1 terests that would not be taxable in
· / the surviving spouse's gross estate.
1f an interest qualifying for the
marital deduction has passed from
the decedent to the surviving spouse,
the deduction may not be waived in
order to reduce the estate of the sur
viving spouse or to obtain other tax
advantages in the estate of the dece
dent or the surviving spouse. Rev.
Ru!. 59-123, 1959-1 C.B. 248. How-
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ever, if the surviving spouse makes a
qualified disclaimer of a property in
terest that otherwise would pass
from the deceased spouse, the dis
claimed interest is not deemed to
pass to the surviving spouse. §§2045
and 2518 of the Code, to which all
future section references will be
made, unless indicated otherwise.
The marital deduction is com
puted on Schedule M.

R

ESIDENCE AND MARITAL
STATUS • Exc e p t
as

otherwise provided by
treaty, the marital deduction is avail
able only in the estate of a decedent
who was either a citizen or a resident
of the United States at the time of
death. §2106; Treas. Reg. §20. 2056(a)
l (a). The surviving spouse, however,
need not be a citizen or a resident of
the United States. Treas. Reg. §20. 2056(a)-l (a).
The decedent must have been
married at the time of death and sur
vived by the spouse. §2056(a). For
purposes of section 2056, a legal
separation does not terminate the
marital status. S.Rep.No. 1013, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1948).
In order to compensate for the un
availability of the marital deduction
to nonresident aliens, for the estates
of nonresident aliens dying after No
vember 13, 1966, the Foreign in
vestors Tax Act reduced the maxi
mum rate of the estate tax from 77
per cent to 25 per cent and increased
the exemption from $2,000 to $30,000.
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Pub. L. No. 89-809, 26 Stat. 861. The
Tax Reform Act of 1976 increased the
maximum tax rate to 30 per cent and
replaced the $30,CXX> exemption with a
unified credit of $3,600. §§210 l (d),
2102(c).
lf the order of death of the dece
dent and the spouse cannot be estab
lished by proof, a presumption that
the spouse survived, created either
by the decedent's will or by local law,
will be given effect if it causes the mar
ital deductionbequest to be included in
the spouse's gross estate. Treas. Reg.
§20.2056(e)-2(e); Estate of Gordon v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 404 (1978),
acq. 1979-1 C.B. l . As to the effect
of the Uniform Simultaneous Death
Act on property held in tenancy by
the entirety, see Rev. Ru!. 76-303,
1976-2 C.B. 266.
lf a state court with jurisdiction
over the parties or the subject matter
declares a divorce invalid, the Inter
nal Revenue Service ("Service") will
follow the decision for federal tax
purposes. Rev. Rul. 67-442, 1967-2
C. B. 65. A second marriage by either
spouse will also be deemed invalid,
and any bequests to the putative sec
ond spouse will not qualify for the
marital deduction.
Not all courts have agreed with the
Service that the second decree ren
ders the divorce invalid for tax pur
poses. Compare Borax' Estate v.
Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935
(1966), Wondsel v. Commissioner,
350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1965), and

25

Feinberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d
260 (3d Cir. 1952), with Gersten v.
Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195 (9th
Cir. 1959). However, the Service gen
erally will not contest the validity of
a divorce until a court of competent
jurisdiction declares the prior divorce
to be invalid. Rev. Rul. 67-442, 1967-2
C.B. 65.

I

NCLUSION IN GROSS ESTATE

•

A property interest cannot
qualify for the marital deduc
tion unless it is included in the dece-,
dent's gross estate. §2056(a).

Examples:
A death benefit payable to the sur
viving spouse under the decedent's
noncontributory qualified pension
or profit-sharing plan would not be
included in the decedent's gross es
tate because of section 2039(c).
Thus, the benefit could not qualify
for the marital deduction.

When the surviving spouse owned a
policy on the life of the decedent that
was not transferred to him by the
decedent within three years of death,
the proceeds would not be included
in the decedent's gross estate, and
they could not, therefore, qualify for
the marital deduction.
A property interest passing to the
surviving spouse as a surviving joint
owner will qualify for the marital de
duction only to the extent that the in
terest is includable in the decedent's
gross estate.
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If a loss deductible under section
2054 occurs with respect to a prop
erty interest, the interest cannot
qualify for the marital deduction to
the extent of the loss. Treas. Reg.
§20.2056(a)-2(b)(3).
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the marital deduction in D's estate.
However, both amounts may be de
ductible under section 2053.

An interest with respect to which a·
qualified disclaimer is made by the
surviving spouse in favor of another
does not pass to the surviving spouse.
ASSAGE TO SURVIVOR •
To be deductible, the prop §§2045, 2518. A disclaimer must be
erty interest must "pass" distinguished from acceptance of the
or have "passed" from the decedent . interest by the surviving spouse, fol
to the surviving spouse. §2056(a). lowed by a transfer. In the latter case,
An interest includable in the dece the interest does pass to the surviving
dent's gross estate may pass to the spouse and may qualify for the mari
tal deduction. The subsequent trans
surviving spouse:
fer may be a taxable gift.
• By bequest, devise, intestacy, dow
er or curtesy, or election against the
Example
will;
H, D's surviving spouse, was entitled
to a $10,000 bequest under D's will
• As an appointee or taker in de
fault under the decedent's exercise or and to $50,000 as the sole beneficiary
nonexercise of a power of appoint of a life insurance policy on the life
of D owned by D. H disclaimed the
ment;
bequest, which was added to the resi
• By a lifetime transfer;
due, passing to D's son, S. H di
rected the life insurance company to
• As the proceeds of life insurance
hold the $50,000 of insurance pro
on the life of the decedent; or
ceeds, pay the interest on this amount
• As a joint tenant with right of sur
to him for life, and on his death, to
pay the principal to S. The $10,000
vivorship. §2056(e).
bequest is considered as having
passed from D to S and thus cannot
Example
H, D's surviving spouse and sole ex qualify for the marital deduction.
ecutor of D's estate, received from The $50,000 of insurance proceeds
D's estate $10,000 in repaymentof a are considered as having passe d
loan made by H to D during D's life from D to H, thus qualifying for the
time, and $5,000 as an executor's marital deduction. For gift tax pur
commission. Neither amount is con poses, H has made a gift to S of the
sidered as passing from D to H, and remainder interest in the insurance
proceeds. Upon H's death, the prothus neither amount can qualify for

P
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ceeds of the insurance policy will be
included in his gross estate, since the
settlement option he elected consti
tuted a transfer of the proceeds, with
a retention of the right to the income
for life. See §2036.
At one time, an interest disclaimed
by another in favor of the surviving
spouse was not deemed to have passed
from the decedent to the surviving
spouse. However, in 1966, section
2056 was amended to provide that in
the case of a decedent dying on or
after October 4, 1966, property pass
ing to the surviving spouse as a result
of a disclaimer by a third party may
qualify for the marital deduction to
the same extent as though the prop
erty had passed to the spouse directly
from the decedent. Although the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 eliminated
the special disclaimer rule in section
2056, it substituted a general dis
claimer rule that has the same effect,
assuming the statutory requirements
of a qualified disclaimer are met.
§§2045, 2518.
An interest acquired by the sur
viving spouse in settlement of a con
test of the decedent's will is consid
ered to have passed from the dece
dent to the surviving spouse if the ac
quisition constituted a bona fide rec
ognition of his rights in the decedent's
estate, as distinguished from a dis
guised gift to him from other benefi
ciaries of the estate. Treas. Reg.
§20.2056( e)-2(d)(2). See Farley v.
United States, 581 F.2d 821 (Ct. Cl.
1978); Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d
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683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 919 (1972). A probate decree
awarding the interest to the surviving
spouse is evidence that the interest
passed because of rights in the estate.
However, a decree is neither essential
nor conclusive. Treas. Reg. §20.205(i(e}2(d)(2); Estate.of Dutcher v. Com
missioner, 34 T.C. 918 (1960); Estate
of Barrett v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.
606 (1954).
The interest must pass to the sur
viving spouse as beneficial owner,
whether outright or in trust for his
benefit. An interest transferred to
the surviving spouse as trustee for
another or subject to a binding
agreement to transfer the interest to
another does not pass to the surviv
ing spouse. Treas. Reg. §20.2056(e)-2(a). Cf McLean v. United States,
65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,12,326 (6th Cir.
1965), aff'g per curiam 224 F. Supp.
726 (E.D. Mich. 1963); First Nat'/
Bank v. Nelson, 355 F.2d 546 (7th
Cir. 1966).
MOUNT OF DEDUCTION

•

Three limitations provide
a ceiling on the maximum
allowable marital deduction:
• The marital deduction may not
exceed the net value of the property
passing to the surviving spouse.
•

The marital deduction may not
exceed the greater of $250,000 or one
half of the decedent's adjusted gross
estate ("the Basic Limitation" ).

•

The Basic Limitation is subject to
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partial reduction if the decedent
made after 1976 lifetime gifts to a
spouse that did not exceed $200,000
("the Gift Tax Limitation").
The net value limitation and the
Basic Limitation are applied sepa
rately, and the more restrictive of the
two controls. The Gift Tax Limita
tion is effective only in connection
with the Basic Limitation. Stated
differently, the marital deduction is
limited to the lesser of the net value
of the property passing to the surviv
ing spouse or the Basic Limitation
less the Gift Tax Limitation.
NET VALUE

The net value of an interest pass
ing to the surviving spouse is the
gross estate tax value-the date-of
death value, alternate valuation date
value, section 2032A value, or sec
tion 2040(c) value-of the interest
less any charges against the interest.
Thus, for example, the gross value
of the interest must be reduced by:
•

Any federal or local estate or in
heritance tax payable, either under
the will or applicable local law, out
of the interest. §2056(b)(4)(A). If the
executor is authorized to pay death
taxes out of the marital share of the
estate, the value of the interest pass
ing to the surviving spouse must be
reduced by the amount of those
taxes, even if the executor actually
pays the death taxes out of the non
marital share and thus leaves the
marital interest intact. Estate of
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Wycoffv. Commiss ioner, 59 T.C. 617
(1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1144 (10th
Cir. 1974); Rev. Rul. 79-14, 1979-1
C. B. 309. Therefore, in order to
maximize the marital deduction,
usually the will should direct that
federal and local death taxes be paid
from the portion of the estate not
qualifying for the marital deduction.
See Doddv. United States, 345 F.2d
714 (3d Cir. 1965). In some cases,
however, it may be preferable to
forego the maximum marital deduc
tion in order to take full advantage
of the unified credit.
•

Any mortgage or other lien to
which the interest is subject. §2056(b)(4)(B). However, if under the will
or applicable local law, the estate is
obligated to discharge the lien, then
the amount of the lien is not deducted
in valuing the interest. Treas. Reg.
§20.2056(b)-4(b).
•

The value of any portion of the in
terest or of any property owned by
the surviving spouse, including any
claims against the decedent's estate,
that must be transferred to another
or surrendered as a condition to tak
ing the interest. United States v.
Stapf, 375 U.S. 118 (1963); Treas.
Reg. §20. 2056(b)-4(b).
•

The value of any income from the
interest that may be utilized to pay
administration expenses during the
period prior to the distribution of the
interest to the surviving spouse or to
a trust for his benefit. Treas. Reg.
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§20. 2056(b)-4(a). Similarly, in valu
ing a vested remainder passing to the
surviving spouse, the actuarial value
of the outstanding income interest
must be deducted. Treas. Reg. §20. 2056(b)-4(d).
• The amount of administration ex
penses chargeable under the will or
applicable local law to a residuary
bequest to the surviving spouse, even
if the executor elects to deduct the
expenses on the estate's income tax
return. Estate of Roney v. Commis
sioner, 33 T.C. 801 (1960), aff'd, 294
F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1961). See also
Ballantine v. Tomlinson, 293 F.2d
311 (5th Cir. 1961).

THE BASIC LIMITATION

The Basic Limitation provides
that the marital deduction may in no
event exceed the greater of $250, 000
-subject to reduction in the case of
community property-or one-half
of the adjusted gross estate. §2056(c)
(1)(A). This formulation of the lim
itation, provided by the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, represents a liberaliza
tion of prior law, which limited the
deduction to no more than one-half
of the adjusted gross estate.
Generally speaking, the 1976 pro
vision is effective for the estates of
decedents dying after 1976. For de
cedents dying before 1979, a special
transitional rule generally continues
the old law in the case of pre-1977
wills and trusts expressing bequests
in terms of a maximum marital de-

29

duction formula. Tax Reform Act of
1976, §2002(d)(l )(B).
Example
D, who has not made any intervivos
gifts to a spouse, dies, leaving an ad
justed gross estate of $300, 000. Un
der D's will, a qualifying interest of
$200,000 passes to the surviving
spouse. Prior law would have limited
the marital deduction to $150, 000one-half the adjusted gross estate of
$300, 000. Current law allows a mari
tal deduction of $200,000, the amount
of the interest passing.
Without Community Property

1f no community property is in
cluded in the decedent's gross estate,
the adjusted gross estate generally
equals the gross estate minus the ex
penses, losses, and debts deducted
by the estate under sections 2053 and
2054. §2056(c)(2)(A). For marital
deduction purposes, the adjusted
gross estate is increased by any gen
eration-skipping transfers of which
the decedent is the deemed trans
feror that occur at the same time as,
or within nine months after, his
death. §2602(c)(5)(A).
The charitable deduction allowed
by section 2055 is not subtracted in
determining the adjusted gross es
tate. Accordingly, transfers to char
itable donees made within three years
of death that are brought back into
the gross estate by section 2035 may
serve to reduce the estate tax liability
by increasing the maximum marital
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deduction. Estate of Russell v. Com
missioner, 70 T.C. 40 (1978), acq.
1979-1 C.B. 1
Administration expenses deducted
on the estate's income tax return are
not subtracted from the gross estate
in computing the adjusted gross es
tate. Rev. Rul. 55-643, 1955-2 C.B.
386. Cf. Jackson v. United States,
376 U.S. 503 (1964). If payable from
the marital share, however, these ex
penses may reduce the value of the
interest passing to the surviving
spouse. See Estate of Roney v. Com
missioner, 33 T.C. 801 (1960); Rev.
Rul. 55-225, 1955-1 C.B. 460.
Example
The value of D's gross estate is
$800,000. Deductions allowed on the
estate tax return under sections 2053
and 2054 for expenses, debts, and
losses total $120,000. D's will pro
vides for a bequest of $40,000 to a
charitable organization, for which a
deduction is allowed under section
2055; a bequest of $400,000 to H,
D's surviving spouse; and a bequest
of the residue, after paying all fed
eral and state death taxes therefrom,
to S, D's surviving son. The adjusted
gross estate is therefore $680,000$800,000 less $120, 000-and the
Basic Limitation limits the marital
deduction to $340,000-the greater
of $250, 000 or one-half the adjusted
gross estate of $680,000. 1f the be
quest to H were only $250,000, then
the marital deduction would have
been $250, 000.
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With Community Property

Married residents of community
property states have already accom
plished a division of their commu
nity assets. In order not to give com
munity property state residents an
advantage over common law state
residents, the Code prevents the fur
ther splitting of community property
for marital deduction purposes by
special rules applicable to the Basic
Limitation.
Thus, in the case of a decedent
who has held community property
with the surviving spouse, the ad
justed gross estate is defined as the
gross estate less the sum of all com
munity property included in the gross
estate and deductions attributable to
the separate property under sections
2053 and 2054, expressed algebraic
ally as that portion of the deductions
which bears the same ratio to the total
deductions as the separate property
in the gross estate bears to the total
gross estate. §2056(c)(2)(B). There
fore, if the decedent's gross estate
consists solely of community prop
erty, the adjusted gross estate will be
zero.
If, however, the decedent's gross
estate includes some separate prop
erty, there will be an adjusted gross
estate equal to the value of the sepa
rate property less the pro rata share
of the deductions under sections
2053 and 2054. In that event, either
the decedent's separate property or
his share of the community property
may qualify for the marital deduc-
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tion, but in an amount no greater
than one-half of the adjusted gross
estate computed according to section
2056(c)(2)(B) or $250, 000 less the
community property adjustment,
whichever is larger.
Example
The value of D's gross estate is
$1,200,000, consisting of $800,000
of separate property and $400,000 of
D's share of community property.
Deductions allowed on the estate tax
return for expenses, debts, and losses
total $180,000. D leaves his separate
property to his son, S, and his com
munity property to his surviving
spouse, H. D's adjusted gross estate
is $680,000, computed as follows:
The gross estate of $1,200,000 less
community property of $400,000
equals $800,000. Subtracting the
deductions attributable to the sepa
rate property of $120, 000-$800,000
over $1,200,000 times $180,000 leaves an adjusted gross estate of
$680,000. Although D left H $400,000,
the allowable marital deduction is
limited to $340, 000-one-half of
$680,000.

In computing the adjusted gross
estate, certain pre-1927 California
community property is treated as sep
arate property, and certain separate
property that resulted from the con
version after December 31, 1941, of
community property is treated as
community property. §§2056(c)(2)
(B) and (C).
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The $250, 000 element of the Basic
Limitation is similarly modified to
take account of community property
by reducing this amount by the ex
cess of the community property in
cluded in the gross estate over the
deductions under sections 2053 and
2054 attributable to the community
property. §2056(c)( l )(C).
Example
The value of D's gross estate is
$300,000, consisting of $200,000 of
separate property and $100,000 of
D's share of community property.
Deductions allowed on the estate tax
return for expenses, debts, and losses
total $45,000. D leaves the commu
nity property to his surviving son, S,
and his separate property to his sur
viving spouse, H. The Basic Limita
tion for D's gross estate will be the
greater of one-half of the adjusted
gross estate or $250,000 less adjust
ments for community property,
computed as follows:
From the gross estate of $300,000,
subtract $100,000 of community
property and $30,000 of deductions
attributable to the separate proper
ty-$200, 000 over $300, 000 times
$45, 000-for an adjusted gross
estate of $170,000 . The $250, 000
limitation adjusted for community
property is $165,000, as the $100,000
of excess community property minus
$15,000 of deductions attributable to
the community property-$ I 00, 000
over $300,000 times $45,000-is sub
tracted from the initial limitation of
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$250,000. The amount of the marital
deduction will therefore be $165,<XX>,
since the $250,<XX> limitation as ad
justed for community property
$165,000-is greater than one-half
of the adjusted gross estate of
$170, 000-$85,000-but less than
the net value of property passing to
the surviving spouse-$200,<XX>.
GIFT TAX LIMITATION

In addition to liberalizing the es
tate tax marital deduction, the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 also eased re
strictions on the gift tax marital de
duction. Under prior law, the gift tax
marital deduction was limited to half
the value of qualifying gifts made to
a spouse. This limitation was changed
in 1976 to provide that the first
$100,000 of qualifying gifts to a
spouse made after 1976 be deducti
ble in full; the next $100, <XX> not be
deductible at all; and gifts made
above $200,<XX> be deductible to the
extent of half their value. §2523(a).
Thus, a greater gift tax marital de
duction is available for gifts to a
spouse that total less than $200, <XX>,
but once the aggregate gifts exceed
$200, <XX>, the gift tax marital deduc
tion is the same under current law as
before 1976.
Apparently, in liberalizing the
estate tax marital deduction, Con
gress was concerned that benefits
would be duplicated unless this
deduction was adjusted to take into
account the liberalization of the gift
tax marital deduction. Accordingly,
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section 2056(c)( l )(B) was added
and amended by the Revenue Act of
1978-to reduce the Basic Limita
tion by the excess of the gift tax
marital deduction allowed to the de
cedent for post-1976 gifts over the
gift tax marital deduction that would
have been allowed to the decedent
for post-1976 gifts if the deduction
were limited to one-half of the value
of the gifts to a spouse required to be
reported on a gift tax return-the
Gift Tax Limitation.
Intervivos gifts that are included
in the gross estate under section 2035
are not taken into account for the
purpose of computing the Gift Tax
Limitation. If the post-1976 report
able marital gifts do not exceed
$200,000 in the aggregate, the
amount computed under the Gift
Tax Limitation will reduce both
elements of the Basic Limita
tion-the $250,000 element and the
one-half of the adjusted gross estate
element. Whichever element, as ad
justed, is larger will be the Basic
Limitation.
Examples
D dies on June I, 1981. His only in
tervivos gift was a cash gift of
$150,000 on February I, 1977, to his
spouse, H. D's adjusted gross estate
-which does not include the inter
vivos gift, since it was made more
than three years before death
equals $400,000. D's will leaves
$300,000 to H, with the residue to his
son. The Gift Tax Limitation will re-
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duce the Basic Limitation by $25, CXX>,
as follows:
Since the gift tax marital deduc
tion in respect of post-1976 gifts is
the first $100, CXX> of gifts, with no
further deduction until the aggregate
post-1976 gifts exceed $200, CXX>, the
excess of the gift tax deduction of
$100, 000 over the $75, 000 that
would have been allowable as a gift
tax marital deduction if the deduc
tion was limited to 50 per cent of the
gifts to the spouse required to be
reported on a return, would be
$25, (XX) -the Gift Tax Limitation.
The Basic Limitation as adjusted by
the Gift Tax Limitation is $225, CXX>
-the greater of $225, CXX> ($250, CXX>
less $25, <XX>) or $175, CXX> (one-half
of the adjusted gross estate of
$200, (XX), less $25, CXX>). The marital
deduction in respect of D's estate
will be $225, 000, since the Basic
Limitation as adjusted by the Gift
Tax Limitation-$225, 000-is not
more than the net value of the prop
erty passing to the surviving spouse
-$300,<XX>.
Had D died on June l , 1977, instead
of June l , 1981, since the $150, CXX>
intervivos gift is included in D's
gross estate, there would be no Gift
Tax Limitation to reduce the Basic
Limitation. Assuming that the sec
tion 2035(c) gross-up is not a factor,
D's adjusted gross estate would be
increased from $400, CXX> to $550,CXX>
as a result of section 2035(a). The
Basic Limitation would be $275, CXX>
-the greater of $250, <XX> or one-half
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of the adjusted gross estate-and
since the Basic Limitation would not
exceed the net value of property
passing to the surviving spouse
$300, 000-the marital deduction
would be $275, CXX>.
The same facts as in the previous Ex
ample, except that D makes one ad
ditional cash gift to H of $3,CXX> on
February l , 1978. Since the 1978
gift is not more than $3, CXX> , no gift
tax marital deduction is allowable
with respect to it and D is not re
quired to include it in a gift tax
return. See §6019(a). Thus, that gift
will have no effect on the computa
tion of the Gift Tax Limitation.
• The
qualifying interest may pass
to the surviving spouse ei
ther outright or, subject to the ter
minable interest rule, in trust. A
transfer by will, whether outright or
in trust, usually takes one of three
forms:

F

ORM OF TRANSFER

•

A transfer of specific property,
such as a bequest of 100 shares of
corporate stock or a devise of Black
acre;
•

A pecuniary bequest, payable in
cash or in kind, such as a bequest of
$100,CXX>; or

•

A transfer of a fractional share or
the entirety of a residuary estate,
such as a bequest of one-half of the
residuary estate.
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The amount of a pecuniary be
quest or the size of a fractional share
of the residue may be either specified
or defined by a formula. A formula
is frequently used to achieve a total
marital deduction precisely equal to
one-half of the adjusted gross estate,
including nonprobate assets like life
insurance and joint property that
qualify for the marital deduction.
Subject to specific exceptions, no
marital deduction is allowed if the
transfer to the surviving spouse is ex
pressed as a pecuniary bequest or gift
that the executor or trustee is per
mitted or directed to satisfy by a dis
tribution in kind at federal estate tax
values, unless either the will itself or
local law provides one of several
protective standards to insure that
the surviving spouse will not be
treated unfairly in the allocation of
estate assets to his share of the estate.
Rev. Proc. 64-19, 1964-1 C.B. 682.
The ground stated for disallowing the
deduction is that the interest passing
to the surviving spouse would not be
ascertainable as of the date of the
decedent's death. See Polasky, Marital
Deduction Formula Clauses in Estate
Planning-Estate and Income Tax
Considerations, 63 Mich. L. Rev.
809 (1965).

T

ERMINABLE INTERESTS

•

The terminable interest rule
seeks to exclude from the
marital deduction an interest that
would not be includable in the sur
viving spouse's gross estate, though
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some interests that are includable
may also be disqualified under the
rule's technical provisions. See Jack
son v. United States, 376 U.S. 503
(1964).
A "terminable interest" is an in
terest that will terminate or fail with
the lapse of time or upon the occur
rence or nonoccurrence of an event
or contingency. §2056(b)(I ). Exam
ples are:
•

A life estate or an estate for a term
of years;

•

An annuity;

•

A patent or copyright;

•

A widow's support allowance that
would, under the applicable local
law, terminate upon the widow's
death or remarriage; and

•

A remainder contingent upon the
remainderman's surviving the in
come beneficiary.

The Code states that a bond, note,
or similar contractual obligation
whose discharge would not have the
effect of an annuity for life or for a
term is not a terminable interest.
§2056(b)(l). The difference between
a note payable in installments with
interest and an annuity for a term of
years is not readily apparent.
A self-liquidating mortgage is like
an annuity for a term, but it is also
like an installment note; consequent
ly, it is uncertain whether it will be
treated as a terminable interest. In all
likelihood, any property interest that
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expires after a stated period or upon
the occurrence of a contingency will
be treated as a terminable interest,
unless expressly excluded by section
2056(b)( l ). Not being expressly men
tioned in section 2056(b)( l ), a self
liquidating mortgage will probably
be considered a terminable interest.
The Service has recently ruled that
an installment contract is a terminable
interest. Rev. Rul. 79-224, 1979-2
C.B. 334.
A statutory widow's support al
lowance of a specified monthly
amount during the administration of
the decedent's estate will constitute a
terminable interest if, under local
law, the allowance is terminated by the
death or remarriage of the widow.
However, if, under local law, the
widow's support allowance indefeas
ibly vests on the decedent's death
and is payable irrespective of the
widow's death or remarriage during
the statutory period for which pay
ment is to be made, the allowance
will not be a terminable interest.
Estate of Green v. United States, 441
F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1971). See also
Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S.
503 (1964).
Thus, the Sixth Circuit has al
lowed a marital deduction for a
widow's allowance because, under
Miehigan law, the widow's right in
defeasibly vested upon the husband's
death, but it denied a marital deduc
tion for a widow's allowance be
cause Tennessee law does not give
the widow an indefeasibly vested
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right to the allowance. Compare
Estate of Gree n v. United States, 44 l
F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1971), with Hamil
ton Nat'/ Bank v. United States, 353
F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1965).
If a widow renounces her deceased
husband's will and elects to take a
dower interest or a forced statutory
share under state law, her share will
qualify for the marital deduction if
the interest she receives is not termin
able. §2056(d)(3); Rev. Rul. 72-8,
1972-1 C.B. 309. In many states, a
widow's dower interest in realty is a
life estate, which is a terminable in
terest. If, under state law, a widow
can elect to receive in lieu of dower a
dollar amount equal to the com
muted value of the dower interest,
the amount paid to her will qualify
for the marital deduction. Rev. Rul.
72-7, 1972-1 C.B. 308, and cases
cited therein. Also, an award of a
dollar amount in lieu of a widow's
homestead pursuant to state law
qualifies for the marital deduction.
Rev. Rul. 72-153, 1972-1 C.B. 309.
DISQUALIFICATIONS

Not all terminable interests are
disqualified for the marital deduc
tion. A terminable interest passing
from the decedent to the surviving
spouse is disqualified if:
•

An interest-whether or not in
cluded in the decedent's gross es
tate-in the same property from
which the terminable interest was
created passes or has passed-
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whether or not at the same time or
under the same instrument-from
the decedent to any person (''trans
feree")-whether or not ascertain
able-other than the surviving spouse
or his estate;
• The interest passes or has passed
to the transferee for less than ade
quate and full consideration in
money or money's worth; and
•

The transferee, or his heirs or
assigns, may possess or enjoy any
part of the property after the termi
nation or failure of the interest pass
ing to the surviving spouse. §2056(b)
(1)(A) and (B).

Examples
The decedent bequeathed his residu
ary estate to his surviving spouse for
her lifetime, with a remainder over
to his children surviving her. (This
bequest would have qualified for the
marital deduction if the surviving
spouse's estate, rather than the chil
dren, was designated as the remain
derman. )

The decedent bequeathed his residu
ary estate to his mother for her life
time, with the remainder over to his
spouse if she survived the mother.
The mother survived the decedent.
(This bequest of a remainder interest
to the spouse would have qualified
for the marital deduction if the
mother had predeceased the dece
dent or if the spouse's remainder in
terest vested on the decedent's death
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rather than being conditioned on the
spouse's surviving the mother.)
The decedent purchased a joint and
survivor's annuity for himself and
his spouse. The annuity contract
provided that upon the death of the
survivor of the decedent and his
spouse, any excess of the cost of the
contract over the total annuity pay
ments previously made shall be re
funded to the then living children of
the decedent. (This annuity would
have qualified for the marital deduc
tion if the contract had not provided
for a refund or if the contract had
provided that any refund would be
payable to the estate of the survivor
of the decedent and his spouse.)
The decedent gave Blackacre to his
son, reserving the income therefrom
for a period of 20 years and be
queathing the estate for a term of
years to his surviving spouse. (The
estate for a term of years would have
qualified for the marital deduction
had the son paid fair value for the in
terest acquired by him in Blackacre.)
If a surviving spouse is required by
the decedent's will to survive the
period of administration of the dece
dent's estate in order to receive a be
quest, the bequest to the spouse will
constitute a terminable interest and
will usually not qualify for the mari
tal deduction. Estate of Fried v.
Commissioner, 445 F.2d 979 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016
(1972).
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A joint will for a husband and
wife should be carefully drawn, since
it may create contractual restrictions
that will disqualify the surviving
spouse's bequest for the marital de
duction. Compare Estate of Krampf
v. Commissioner, 464 F.2d 1398 (3d
Cir. 1972), aff'g per curiam 56 T.C.
293, Opal v. Commissioner, 450
F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1971), and Estate
of Goldstein v. United States, 72-1
U.S. Tax Cas. �12,819 (D. Minn.
1971), all of which denied a marital
deduction, with Estate of Salvatore
Aquilino, 31T.C.M. (CCH)906 (1972),
allowing a deduction. Similarly, in
drafting reciprocal or mutual wills,
care must be employed not to impose
any contractual restrictions that might
disqualify a bequest for a marital
deduction.
A terminable interest is also dis
qualified if it is to be acquired for the
surviving spouse, pursuant to direc
tions of the decedent, by the dece
dent's executor or trustee. §2056(b)
( l)(C). The disqualification occurs
even though no person other than
the surviving spouse acquires an in
terest in the property.
Example
D bequeathed $100,000 to H, the
surviving spouse for whom the ex
ecutor was directed to purchase a
nonrefundable life annuity with this
money. The bequest does not qualify
for the marital deduction. The result
would be the same if the executor
was directed to purchase a patent,
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copyright, or, probably, a self-liqui
dating mortgage for H.
EXCEPTIONS

In order to permit certain conven
ient dispositive arrangements, the
Code makes three exceptions to the
terminable interest rule:
Death of Surviving Spouse

An interest passing to the surviv
ing spouse is not considered a ter
minable interest solely because it will
terminate or fail upon the death of
the surviving spouse within a period
not in excess of six months after the
decedent's death or as a result of a
common disaster resulting in the
death of the decedent and the surviv
ing spouse, if the termination or
failure does not, in fact, occur. §2056(b )(3). The proper method of com
puting the six-month period is dis
cussed in Rev. Rul. 70-400, 1970-2
C.B. 196.
Because of the risk that a condi
tion that the spouse must survive for
a period of six months might not
comply with section 2056(b)(3) as a
consequence of the manner in which
the period is measured under local
law, conservative drafting practice
will limit a survivorship requirement
to no more than five months.
Examples
D, by will, leaves to H, the surviving
spouse, a life estate in Greenacre,
with the remainder to X. D's will
provides that H shall have no interest
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in Greenacre if he dies within five
months after D. H, in fact, survives
D by more than five months. Since
the contingency specified in the sur
vivorship clause-death within five
months-did not, in fact, occur, the
survivorship clause does not prevent
qualification for the marital deduc
tion. However, the failure of the
contingency to occur cannot convert
an otherwise nondeductible termin
able interest-a life estate with a re
mainder over to a third person-into
a deductible interest. Thus, H's in
terest in Greenacre does not qualify
for the marital deduction.
D and his spouse, W, were injured in
an automobile accident. As a result
of injuries sustained, D died one
week after the accident and W died a
week after him. D's will left his en
tire estate to W, with a proviso that if
both D and W "die in a common
disaster, " the entire estate shall pass
to D's son. Under the applicable
local law, a husband and wife are
deemed to have died in a common
disaster if they both died within 30
days after a common accident and
injuries sustained in the accident
contributed to their death. No mari
tal deduction is allowed in D's estate,
since the contingency specified in the
common disaster clause did, in fact,
occur. If, however, W had recovered
from her injuries, she would have
received D's estate, and the bequest
to her would have qualified for the
marital deduction.
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The marital deduction will be dis
allowed if, at the time of the final
audit of the decedent's return, the
surviving spouse may possibly be de
prived of the interest passing to him
that is subject to a common disaster
provision-as distinguished from the
six-month survivorship provision
because of the construction of the
common disaster provision under
applicable local law. Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-3(c). For this, and other rea
sons, a common disaster clause fre
quently is a poor drafting tool.
Power of Appointment

An interest, whether passing out
right or in trust, will not be treated as
a terminable interest if:
• The surviving spouse is entitled
for life to all the income from the in
terest, or from a specific portion
thereof, payable annually or at more
frequent intervals;
•

The surviving spouse has the
power, exercisable by him alone and
in all events, to appoint the entire in
terest, or a specific portion thereof,
to himself or to his estate; and
•

There is no power in any person
other than the surviving spouse to
appoint any part of the interest to
any person other than the surviving
spouse. Treas. Regs. §§20.2056(b)-5(a)( l ), (2), (4), and (5); Rev. Ruis.
66-38, 1966-1 C.B. 212, 66-39, 19661 C.B. 223.
The surviving spouse's general
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power of appointment may be exer
cisable during lifetime or by will, or
both. A surviving spouse who pos
sesses the requisite power of appoint
ment may also hold lesser powers
without disqualifying the trust. Treas.
Reg. §20.2056(b)-5(g)(5). A person
other than the surviving spouse may
hold a power of appointment over
the interest, provided that this power
is exercisable solely in favor of the
surviving spouse.
Example
The decedent bequeathed $500,000
in trust for the benefit of the surviv
ing spouse. The trustee was directed
to pay to the spouse all the trust in
come, at least annually, for life and
to apply principal in amounts suffi
cient to meet expenses of illness or
other emergencies. In addition, the
trustee was authorized to pay or ap
ply such additional amounts of prin
cipal as the trustee determined to be
in the best interest of the spouse. In
any year in which trust income was
less than $20,000, the spouse had the
right to draw from the principal of
the trust the difference between the
trust income from that year and
$20,000. The spouse was given the
power to appoint by will to the
spouse's estate or to any other ap
pointee any trust principal remaining
at the spouse's death. To the extent
that the spouse did not exercise this
power, the remaining trust principal
was to be distributed to the children
of the decedent surviving the spouse.
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The grant of administrative powers
to the trustee of a marital trust may
disqualify bequests to the trust if the
exercise of the powers could deprive
the surviving spouse of the beneficial
enjoyment required by the statute.
See Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-5(f)(4);
Rev. Rul. 69-56, 1969-1 C.B. 224.
Several cases decided under the tax
law prior to the Tax Reform Act of
1969 denied a charitable deduction
for a remainder interest in a trust be
queathed to a qualified charity be
cause of the administrative powers
granted the fiduciary, such as the un
restricted power to allocate receipts
between income and corpus combined
with a power to invest in mutual
funds or in wasting assets without es
tablishing a reserve or sinking fund.
Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 112,886
(6th Cir. 1972); Atwell v. United
States, 339 F. Supp. 425 (S.D. Tex.
1972).
Nonetheless, if the fiduciary's ad
ministrative powers are sufficiently
restricted under local law to preclude
him from manipulating the trust in
come to the detriment of the surviv
ing spouse, the administrative powers
should not adversely affect the claim
for a marital deduction. Cf &tate
of Toulmin v. United States, 462
F. 2d 978 (6th Cir. 1972). Still, great
care should be taken drafting the ad
ministrative powers granted the fidu
ciary under the testator's will.
The testator's will should include
a provision stating his intention that

40

THE PRACTICAL LA WYER (Vol. 26-No. 7)

the bequest to the surviving spouse
qualify for the marital deduction.
Then, should the bequest to the spouse
be made in trust and fail to qualify
for the marital deduction under one in
terpretation of an ambiguous clause
in the trust but not under another,
the statement of the testator's intent
might well induce a court to adopt
the more favorable construction as
reflecting his probable intent.
Thus, in Virginia Nat'/ Bank v.
United States, 443 F.2d 1030 (4th
Cir. 1971), the court relied on parol
evidence of the testator's intent to
qualify a bequest for the marital
deduction, even though a forfeiture
provision in the trust that would
have disqualified the bequest for a
marital deduction was thereby in
validated. Earlier, however, the
Fourth Circuit had declined to give
any weight to the testator's intention
to qualify a bequest for the marital
deduction. Estate of Pierpont v.
Commissioner, 336 F.2d 177 (4th
Cir. 1964). See Guiney v. United
States, 425 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1970);
Frank v. Frank, 253 Md. 413, 253
A.2d 377 (1969).
Insurance or Annnity Proceeds

An interest in the proceeds of a
life insurance, endowment, or annui
ty contract will be treated as passing
solely to the surviving spouse if,
under the contract, while the pro
ceeds are being held by the insurer,
the surviving spouse has the right to
the interest on, or the installment pay-
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ments of, the proceeds for life and
the right to appoint to himself or to
his estate the unpaid proceeds or in
stallment payments. §2056(b)(6).
These requirements concerning the
spouse's income interest and general
power of appointment are substan
tially the same as the requirements
under section 2056(b)(5). For the ef
fect of formal limitations on the sur
viving spouse's right of withdrawal,
compare Estate of Jennings v. Com
missioner, 39 T.C. 417 (1962), acq.
1964-1 C.B. 4, and Estate of Corn
well v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 688
(1962), acq. 1964-l C.B. 4, with
Werbe's Estate v. United States, 273
F.2d 201 (7th Cir. J959).
The life estate power of appoint
ment exceptions to the terminable in
terest rule are considered in great de
tail in Treas. Regs. §§20.2056(b)-5
and 6. They should be studied before
attempting to draft a will or a trust
provision complying with section
2056(b)(5) or giving an opinion on
whether the settlement provisions of
a life insurance, endowment, or an
nuity contract meet the requirements
of section 2056(b)(6). Furthermore,
whether the provisions of a will,
trust, or contract meet the require
ments of sections 2056(b)(5) or (6)
must be determined by construing
the provisions according to the ap
plicable local law and in the context
of the entire instrument.
SPECIFIC PORTIONS

A specific portion of an interest
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may qualify under sections 2056(b)(5)
or (6). The term "specific portion"
means a specified fractional share, as
distinguished from a specified amount.
Treas. Reg. §20. 2056(b)-5(c).
In Northeastern Nat'/ Bank, 387
U.S. 213 (1967), the Court invalidat
ed the regulatory definition of "spe
cific portion" as applied to the re
quirement under section 2056(b)(5)
that the surviving spouse be granted
all the income from a specific por
tion of the property passing from the
decedent. The decedent had made a
testamentary bequest to a trust
under the terms of which his widow
was to receive $300 a month for the
rest of her life. Upon the widow's
death, she was empowered to ap
point the entire corpus of the trust by
will. The Court held that a deter
mination should be made of the
amount of trust principal that would
produce an income of $300 per
month on the basis of a reasonable
rate of return. That amount of prin
cipal, though unspecified in the will,
would qualify for the marital deduc
tion. The case was remanded to the
district court to select a proper rate
of return and to compute the amount
of the deduction. Accord, Citizens
Nat'/ Bank v. United States, 359
F.2d 8I7 (7th Cir. I966); Gelb v.
Commissioner, 298 F. 2d 544 (2d Cir.
1962).
There is a difference between
granting the surviving spouse the in
come from a fractional share of a
trust and granting an unvarying
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amount of income. In the first situa
tion, the spouse's income may fluc
tuate as the trust assets appreciate or
decline in value, while in the second
situation the spouse is not affected
by the rise and fall in the value of the
trust assets. The Supreme Court,
however, rejected the argument that
Congress was concerned with this
distinction when it enacted the mari
tal deduction provision.
Section 2056(b)(5) also permits the
decedent to grant the surviving
spouse a power of appointment over
a specific portion of the trust assets.
If the term "specific portion" refers
only to a fractional share, as the
Treasury Regulations provide, the
value of the assets subject to the
power will fluctuate according to
changes in market value, and in view
of the present inflationary spiral, the
amount included in the surviving
spouse's gross estate at his death will
probably be larger than the amount
of the deduction granted the dece
dent. But if the term includes a
power over a dollar amount of
assets, the value to be included in the
surviving spouse's gross estate on his
death will be equal to the deduction
granted the decedent.
In Northeastern Nat'/ Bank v.
United States, 387 U.S. 213, 224-25
(1967), the Court noted that the con
struction of the term "specific por
tion" for purposes of the power of
appointment requirement might dif
fer from the construction adopted by
the Court for purposes of applying
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the current income requirement. The
Court did not need-and it expressly
deelined-to resolve that question,
since the widow in Northeastern had
a testamentary power to appoint the
entire trust corpus. Consequently,
the meaning of "specific portion"
remains unsettled as to the power of
appointment provision.
Examples
D made a testamentary transfer of
$200, 000 to a trust which provided
that D's spouse, H, was to receive
$300 a month for the rest of his life
and have a testamentary general
power of appointment over the en
tire corpus. The amount of trust cor
pus that will produce income of $300
a month determined at some appro
priate rate of return will qualify for
the marital deduction, but the rest of
the trust assets will not.

D made a testamentary transfer of
$200, 000 to a trust which provided
that D's spouse, H, was to receive all
the income from the trust, payable
monthly, for the rest of his life. H
was also granted a testamentary gener
al power of appointment over $100, <XX>
of trust assets. Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-S(c) denies any marital deduction
to D's estate for this bequest, and the
validity of this Regulation is not
resolved.

N

ONQUALIFYING ASSETS
•

If the interest passing to
the surviving spouse may

be satisfied out of assets that would
not have qualified for the marital
deduction had they passed specifical
ly from the decedent to the surviving
spouse, then, for the purpose of
computing the marital deduction,
the value of the interest passing to
the surviving spouse must be reduced
by the value of the nonqualifying
assets. §2056(b)(2).
Example
D bequeathed one-half of t h e
residuary estate, worth $80,000, to
H, the surviving spouse. Included in
the residuary estate is an estate for a
term of years, worth $20, 000, that
was reserved by D in a lifetime gift to
his son. If, under the will and appli
cable local law, D's executor could
allocate the entire estate for a term of
years to H, then, whether or not the
executor allocates that estate for a
term of years to H, for purposes of
the marital deduction, the value of
the bequest to H must be reduced by
$20, 000 to $60,000. If, under the will
and applicable local law, the ex
ecutor could allocate to H only an
undivided one-half interest in the
estate for a term of years, then the
value of the bequest would be re
duced by $10,000 to $70,000.
On the other hand, if D's will had
directed that any interests not quali
fying for the marital deduction
should not be allocated to H's share
of the estate, then no reduction
would have been required. Treas.
Reg. §20.2056(b)-2(d).

